In ethical and educational systems, the accumulation of theoretical knowledge alone is insufficient to effect genuine behavioral transformation, while the separation of knowledge (ʿilm) from practice (ʿamal) constitutes a major impediment to human spiritual perfection. Accordingly, clarifying the relationship between knowledge and practice is of fundamental importance. This study investigates the transition from the theoretical to the practical realm and the consequences of disrupting this relationship within the intellectual framework of Amīr al-Muʾminīn, Imam ʿAlī (a.s.). Adopting a descriptive-analytical approach, it examines the semantic network of key concepts in the Nahj al-Balāghah, particularly hatf, thamara, yaqīn, and taqwā, to reconstruct the epistemic structure governing the relationship between cognition and action. The findings reveal that, in Alavid wisdom (al-Ḥikmah al-ʿAlawiyyah), knowledge and practice are united by an ontological and inseparable bond. Genuine knowledge necessarily entails practical commitment; when divorced from action, it loses its authenticity and efficacy, culminating in its departure (irtiḥāl). Conversely, practice is not merely the product of knowledge but the essential means by which the soul attains perfection, transforming cognition from conceptual certainty (ʿilm al-yaqīn) to immediate experiential certainty (ʿayn al-yaqīn). Within this epistemological framework, taqwā functions as a protective and regulative faculty that restrains illusion and capricious desire (hawā) from overpowering reason. The Nahj al-Balāghah therefore portrays the rupture between theory and practice not simply as a moral deficiency but as a profound epistemic disorder that erodes authentic knowledge and ultimately reduces the scholar to ignorance.